

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13

OMB-01 ACDA-07 MC-02 OES-06 /086 W

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P R 311530Z OCT 76

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6226

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY KUWIAT

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T JIDDA 7148

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA, US, XF

SUBJECT: SUCCESS OF CAIRO SUMMIT

SUMMARY: SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, THE UAE AND QATAR TO PAY 65 PER CENT OF THE SUPPORT COSTS OF ARAB DETERRENT FORCE IN LEBANON; SAG ESTIMATES THESE COSTS WILL TOTAL \$90 MILLION OVER NEXT SIX MONTHS. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO PASS HAT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, BUT SAUDI ARABIA AT THE RIGHT TIME WILL PARTICIPATE AND BELIEVES THAT NON-ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO DO SO ALSO. AT LEAST 20,000 SYRIAN TROOPS WILL REMAIN IN LEBANON, AND EFFORT BY ARAFAT FOR MORE "BALANCED" MILITARY REPRESENTATION WAS SHELVED (SAG -- UNLIKE SYRIA -- DOES NOT WANT ARAFAT TO BE REMOVED FROM PLO CHAIRMANSHIP). SAG HAS URGED THAT QUADRIPARTITE TEAM GET TO WORK FAST; IT HOPES USG WILL DO ITS PART AND SEE THAT ISRAEL BEHAVES RESPONSIBLY AND DOES NOT COMPLICATE PRESIDENT SARKIS' DIFFICULT JOB. END

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SUMMARY.

1. MFA'S UNDER SECRETARY AL-MANSOURI TOLD ME OCT 30 THAT THE CAIRO SUMMIT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND HAD CONFIRMED THE EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RIYADH MEETING. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD, FOR INSTANCE, THAT SYRI'S TROOPS WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE UP AT LEAST 20,000 OF THE 9,000 OR 30,000 MEN OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF). IRAQ AND THE PLO HAD NOT LIKED THIS, AND THE PLO HAD CALLED FOR "BALANCED PRECENCE OF FORCES" IN LEBANON. THE PLO'S OBJECTION, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN DEALT WITH AND EFFECTIVELY SHELVED BY THE CONFERENCE DECIDING THAT ANY NATIONS THAT WANTED TO VOLUNTEER MORE TROOPS COULD DO SO, PROVIDED THEY RECEIVED THE APPROVAL OF LEBANESE PRESEDENT SARKIS. MANSOURI WAS PRETTY SURE THE LIBYANS WOULD NOT INCREASE THEIR MILITARY COMPONENT BEYOND THE PRESENT 600, AND THOUGH SUDAN MIGHT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ITS TROOPS FROM 500 TO 1000.

2. THE ADF WOULD BE PAID FOR AS FOLLOWS: THE COSTS OF ITS MAINTENANCE WERE ESTIMATED TO BE \$500,000 A DAY OR \$15 MILLION A MONTH. ARAB LEADERS HAD AGREED THAT SUCH A FORCE SHOULD BE FUNDED FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS, WITH THE COSTS TO BE BORNE AS FOLLOWS: SAUDI ARABIA 20 PER CENT, KUWAIT 20 PER CENT, THE UAE 15 PER CENT; QATAR 10 PER CENT, FOR A TOTAL OF 65 PER CENT. EGYPT MADE A \$1 MILLION ONE-TIME SYMBOLIC PAYMENT, AND LIBYA MADE A SIMILAR \$3 MILLION PAYMENT -- PRESUMABLY TO COVER THE MAINTENANCE COSTS OF ITS OWN UNIT.

3. MANSOURI SAID THE SUMMIT LEADERS HAD AGREED THAT LEBANON NEEDED MASSIVE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, BUT FELT (A) IT WAS TOO EARLY TO ESTABLISH A TARGET AMOUNT, AND (B) THE LIST OF DONORS SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO ARAB STATES. MANSOURI SAID GERMANY AND JAPAN, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH A FUND, AND I REMARKED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A CONTRIBUTION ALSO.

4. MANSOURI SAID THE SAG BELIEVED THE CEASEFIRE MIGHT HOLD AND THAT THE ARAB STATES MIGHT BE GETTING ON TOP OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR. TIME WAS VALUABLE, HOWEVER, AND SAUDI ARABIA HAD NAMED ITS AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON (AND FROMER MILITARY ATTACHE) AS THE SAUDI REPRESENTATIVE TO THE QUADRIPARTITE TEAM TO SUPER-SECRET

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WISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIYADH AND CAIRO AGREEMENTS. THE SAG HAS ASKED SYRIA, EGYPT AND KUWAIT TO BE EQUALLY PROMPT IN GETTING THE QUADRIPARTITE TEAM GOING BEFORE THE MOMENTUM OF THE RIYADH/CAIRO CONFERENCE DIMINISHED. IN THE MEANTIME, THE SAG WAS CERTAIN THAT EXTREMISTS AMONG THE MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS WOULD BOTH TRY TO UNDERMINE A SETTLEMENT. ISRAEL, TOO, MIGHT TRY TO INCITE TROUBLES IN THE SOUTH. SPEAKING FOR THE SAG, MANSOURI SAID HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD URGE ISRAEL

TO BEHAVE IN A RESTRAINED AND RESPONSIBLE WAY AS PRESIDENT  
SARKIS BEGAN THE DIFFICLT JOB OF BRINGING LEBANON BACK TO  
NORMAL.

5. MANSOURI SAID SAG OF COURSE SUPPORTED ADF'S SYRIAN-  
DOMINATED ROLE IN LEBANON, BUT SAID SAG AND SYRIA DIFFERED IN  
THEIR APPROACH TO PLO LEADERSHIP. SYRIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE  
ARAFAT OUT, WHILE SAG BELIEVES ARAFAT A MODERATE, AND BETTER  
THAN ANYONE LIKELY TO REPLACE HIM. MANSOURI ACKNOWLEDGED,  
HOWEVER, THAT ARAFAT'S ABILITY TO CONTROL PLO EXTREMISTS NEVER  
GOOD, AND SAG WAS NOT RPT NOT SURE IT WAS ALL THAT MUCH BETTER  
NOW -- DESPITE LESSONS THAT PLO SHOULD HAVE LEARNED FROM CIVIL  
WAR. I COMMENTED THAT PLO HAD NOT LEARNED MUCH FROM  
SEPTEMBER 1970 EXPERIENCES IN JORDAN EITHER.

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